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Abstract
How to distribute welfare in a society is a key issue in the subject of distributional justice, which is deeply
involved with notions of fairness. Following a thought experiment by Dworkin, this work considers a
society of individuals with different preferences on the welfare distribution and an official to mediate the
coordination among them. Based on a simple assumption that an individual’s welfare is proportional
to how her preference is fulfilled by the actual distribution, we show that an egalitarian preference is a
strict Nash equilibrium and can be favorable even in certain inhomogeneous situations. These suggest
how communication can encourage and secure a notion of fairness.
Introduction
Background
The concept of distributive justice has been extensively studied in political philosophy and economics
over the past few decades. One of the most important milestones in this field is Rawls’ A Theory of
Justice [1], which put forward equality as an outcome of the social contract that individuals behind a
veil of ignorance should agree on. Even though egalitarian doctrine that all human persons are equal in
fundamental worth or moral status is a commonly shared idea, egalitarianism turns out to be a contested
concept. There have been several divergent understandings of the meaning of equality, ways to achieve
equality, or the metric to measure equality [2, 3]. For instance, someone who puts more emphasis on
equality of opportunity may have a very different opinion from those who put emphasis on equality of
incomes in spite of the overall agreement on the concept of equality per se.
Among numerous dimensions where egalitarianism varies, the question of what should be equalized is
one that many different theories are competing on; is it opportunity, capabilities, resource or welfare [2–6]?
Dworkin, one of the most influential proponents of resource egalitarianism, admits the immediate appeal
of the idea that it must ultimately be equality of welfare insofar as equality is important, and examines
the logical consistency and practical applicability of this welfare egalitarianism [7]. According to Dworkin,
welfare egalitarianism, concerned with equality in every person’s overall satisfaction, has an inconsistency
in its logic. For example, if one accepts the idea that those who are handicapped need more resources to
achieve equal welfare, the same argument should apply to those who have expensive tastes for the same
reason. However, one should immediately recognize that the appeal of welfare egalitarianism becomes
much less strong in the case of expensive tastes than in the case of the handicapped. The fact that the
same idea can be accepted in some cases and seems disturbing in other cases reveals a logical inconsistency
of welfare egalitarianism. Dworkin also criticized welfare-based egalitarianism on that it inevitably relies
on the possibility of interpersonal comparisons of utility, which places a large burden to a policy maker
in practice. Lastly, Dworkin argues that it would probably prove impossible to reach a reasonable degree
of equality in this conception in a community whose members held very different and very deeply felt
political theories about justice in distribution.
2The last point is the one that we focus on in this paper. We will show that the existence of con-
tradictory political theories does not immediately lead to the impossibility but can be formulated as
dynamics which admits a unique solution under certain assumptions. By doing this, we will argue that
the reasoning in [7] can be regarded as a tool to analyze and advocate the idea of equality in welfare.
To some extent, this is complementary to a previous work which argues that one can reach the idea of
equality in welfare by starting from that of equality in resources [8]. Following the logic that Dworkin
used when he showed the impossibility to reach an agreement on redistribution in terms of welfare, we
also set aside the issues of logical inconsistency and inter-personal comparisons of individuals’ welfare.
To focus on the relationship between individual preferences and resulting welfare, we also set aside the
issue of impartiality (see, e.g., [9, 10]). We will further assume that individuals have preferences over
the distribution of welfare among them [11, 12]. Many theoretical and experimental studies have shown
that people are concerned with equality and fairness and often persist in fairness even when they lose
monetary payoffs in doing so, e.g., in the public games, ultimatum games or dictator games. This be-
havior cannot be explained based on the assumption of self-regarding preferences but of others-regarding
preferences or social preferences. Our formulation in this paper can serve as a systematic description for
such an approach, because it tells us a way to translate others’ payoffs into an individual’s with respect
to individual preference.
Model
Let the concept of welfare be understood as the fulfillment of preferences [13], including success in political
preferences, i.e., opinions of how welfare should be distributed. Then the reasoning by Dworkin [7] argues
that such an egalitarian society, where everyone is concerned with the equality, will end up with supporting
non-egalitarians by its own logic. Suppose that a bigot enters an egalitarian society, with an opinion that
some people deserve more than the others. This person will feel frustrated to see that her political
preferences are not accepted by egalitarian neighbors, and her welfare becomes relatively lower than
the others’. If there is an official committed to compensating for inequality in welfare, by reallocating
resources for example, the bigot should get extra resources from the official due to her political frustration,
because she does not support the egalitarian idea of the society. This is called Dworkin’s paradox in this
work. Particularly we note that it can serve as an idealized model to represent our understanding of a
modern democratic society. We will look into this hypothetical society a little closer.
Imagine a society of N persons and an official. The official, representing a social institution, exists to
mediate the global coordination. We assume that the total amount of welfare to be distributed among
the persons is fixed as unity, and that the welfare is infinitely divisible, since we are interested only
in relative fractions rather than absolute amounts that individuals have. The official herself does not
take part in sharing the welfare, but only receives the N persons’ opinions and find a way to distribute
the welfare among them. Let each person i have a certain preference about how the welfare should be
distributed, say vi = (vi1, vi2, . . . , viN ) with
∑
j vij = 1. We denote the actual welfare distribution as
r = (r1, r2, . . . rN ). The person i’s welfare is determined by the extent to which her preference is fulfilled.
In other words, we consider an equation
ri = F(vi, r) (1)
with a certain function F , which is assumed to equally apply to all the persons. We suppose that the
official wants to announce a stable welfare distribution r such that each person’s relative share remains
unchanged after the announcement, which means that r solves Eq. (1) self-consistently. It is important to
note that the preferences reported by each individual are assumed to be true and available to the official
at every moment, which helps us to focus on basic ideas of the paradox. A few remarks are in order. First,
we emphasize that the official plays only a passive role in this setup. As we will see below, the society
reaches the same self-consistent solution as long as every person’s welfare becomes public knowledge all
the time. The official may guarantee such information to be accessible and accelerate the coordination
3but the official is basically assigned limited tasks compared to the original argument. Second, related to
the first point, we do not require the division of welfare to be impartial from a certain observer’s point of
view. Our question is simply how much fulfillment one can get depending on her preference. In this sense,
our approach differs from the impartial-division problem [9] and does not touch conceptual difficulties of
impartiality (see, e.g., [10]). Finally, individuals are not behind the veil of ignorance. Rather, each of
them is supposed to construct a concrete opinion about every other individual using any kind of available
information. Although this can impose practical difficulties in a large society, it helps us avoid any
theoretical ambiguity or conflict with the ethic of priority [14] found in the veil of ignorance [15].
In order to give a more concrete form to Eq. (1), we first consider how to measure similarity or affinity
between distributions and then plug it into Eq. (1). Suppose two arbitrary distributions, p = (p1, . . . , pN)
and q = (q1, . . . , qN ), with pi ≥ 0, qi ≥ 0, and
∑N
i pi =
∑N
i qi = 1. We define a suitable affinity function
ρN (p,q) between them, whose specific functional form will be characterized by requiring the following
four postulates [16]. First, we postulate separability, which means that one can refine affinity contribution
from a certain bin by looking into the bin in a higher resolution without referring to the outside of the bin.
Second, we postulate invariance under permutation, because every bin is equivalent. Third, the affinity
should be non-negative, i.e., ρN(p,q) ≥ 0, where ρN(p,q) = 0 if and only if p is orthogonal to q, whereas
a maximum value is obtained if and only if p = q. The distributions p and q are orthogonal when pi = 0
for every non-zero qi and vice versa. Last, it should be symmetric in the sense that ρN (p,q) = ρN (q,p),
which is intuitively justified. These four postulates characterize our affinity function as
ρN (p,q) ∝
N∑
i=1
(piqi)
1/2, (2)
commonly known as the Bhattacharyya measure [17]. While details of the derivation are shown in
Appendix, this functional form has a clear geometric interpretation: it can be viewed as a dot product of
two vectors (
√
x1,
√
x2, . . .
√
xN ) and (
√
y1,
√
y2, . . .
√
yN ), both of which are located on an N -dimensional
unit sphere by
∑
i
(√
xi
)2
=
∑
i
(√
yi
)2
= 1. It therefore becomes maximized when two vectors point in
the same direction.
It is plausible to assume that the function F(vi, r) in Eq. (1) will be a non-decreasing function of
the affinity between vi and r, so that F(vi, r) = F [ρN (vi, r)]. Specifically, we infer that F(vi, r) ∝
ρ2N (vi, r), since ρN (vi, r) contains dimensionality of
√
ri according to Eq. (2). The precise value of
the proportionality coefficient should be determined by the normalization condition of r. For notational
convenience, let us define s ≡ (s1, s2, . . . , sN ) with si ≡ √ri andwi ≡ (wi1, wi2, . . . , wiN ) with wij ≡ √vij .
Equation (1) then leads to si ∝
∑
j wijsj , or in a matrix form,
s = λ−1Ws (3)
where W ≡ {wij} and λ is for normalizing |s|2, the total welfare. This formalism is reminiscent of the
quantum mechanics, where a wavefunction ψ is obtained by solving an eigenvalue problem Hψ = Eψ
with a Hamiltonian matrix H and its eigenvalue E. What one can measure in experiments is probability
density |ψ|2. An N -dimensional matrix preserving |s|2 is called orthogonal, and its degrees of freedom is
the number of possible planes of rotation in N dimension, which is N(N − 1)/2. Since W generally has
N2 elements and N normalization conditions, it has N(N − 1) degrees of freedom, so the magnitude of
λ will differ from one in general.
4Results
Two-person case
The simplest example ofW describes a situation where two persons have not ever conceived of each other
as a society member to share welfare with. The corresponding matrix is written as
W =
(
1 0
0 1
)
.
This identity matrix does not change the input state at all, which means that the official cannot really
coordinate these two indifferent persons’ opinions in the way that we have assumed. This is actually an
example of a reducible matrix [18] or a society that can be divided into smaller pieces: W is irreducible if
there exists a sequence of [k1, k2, . . . , kn] for any i and j such that wik1 ×wk1k2 × · · · ×wknj is non-zero.
Otherwise, W is reducible. Such a reducible case is not our concern since a society is meaningful only
when individuals interact with each other. Henceforth, only irreducible cases are considered. Then, unless
everyone has zero self-interest, one can prove that there exists a unique stable distribution rp for every
W by using the Perron-Frobenius theorem [18]. In other words, rp is the only stable fixed point under
the action of W , so the official should distribute welfare as given by rp.
Let us consider a situation where an egalitarian with v1 = (1/2, 1/2) meets a selfish person with
v2 = (0.01, 0.99). The corresponding matrix formulation will be
W =
(
1/
√
2 1/
√
2
1/10
√
99/10
)
. (4)
and its stable welfare distribution is obtained by analyzing eigenvectors as rp ≈ (0.72, 0.28). We arrive
at this rp even if we start from r = (0.5, 0.5) for the following reason: let r be known to both the persons
every time step. The egalitarian first feels happy to see the initial equality in r = (0.5, 0.5), while the
selfish person feels unsatisfied, which makes a difference at the next step. The drop in r2 makes the selfish
person even more upset, so her welfare continues to decrease until it reaches the stable value, r2 = 0.28.
We now show that egalitarianism is the minimax solution of this two-person zero-sum game [19].
Generalizing Eq. (4) as
W =
( √
v11
√
1− v11√
1− v22 √v22
)
, (5)
the eigenvalue analysis yields the converged share for the first person, r1, as shown in Fig. 1. It is a
saddle-like shape and this person can minimize risk when she has demanded a moderate share of 1/2 at
the first place. The same is true for the other person as well. Although we have assumed fixed preferences
in developing the model, if the preferences can evolve in the long run to maximize individual welfare,
therefore, this plot shows that this two-person case will lead to an equal welfare distribution.
In practice, a selfish person can be tempted to deceive the official by reporting a false preference to
receive a larger share. Provided that person 2 has claimed her self-interest as a certain value v22, person
1 can always compute the best reply v˜11 = b(v22) by looking up the maximal share r˜1 at the given v22
in Fig. 1. Even if her true self-interest v11 is higher than this false v˜11, she should still report v˜11 to the
official, knowing that she cannot get better than r˜1 in any way. When person 1 has chosen v˜11 for this
reason, the same consideration will lead person 2 to choose v˜22 = b(v˜11) = b[b(v22)], and this reasoning
can be repeated between them ad infinitum. Such a strategic consideration eventually forces them to
choose the egalitarian preference in common, since successive iteration of the best-reply function b drives
every initial input v22 ∈ [0, 1) into the egalitarian fixed point, although none of the players are really
egalitarians.
5Egalitarianism as a Nash equilibrium
Let us consider an N -person case where all except one are egalitarian. That is, vi = (1/N, . . . , 1/N) for
every i 6= 1. We observe that these N − 1 persons will have exactly the same welfare since they always
get the same amount of affinity for any welfare distribution r. Let us thus denote every egalitarian’s
welfare as a single variable R. Recalling the separability, we find that all the elements v1i with i 6= 1
must be the same in order to maximize person 1’s welfare, because her preference about the egalitarians
should match with welfare distribution among them. Therefore, person 1 should have a preference of
v1 = (v11, V, V, · · · , V ) with V ≡ (1− v11)/(N − 1). As a consequence, the full N ×N matrix calculation
can be simplified to the following 2× 2 matrix calculation( √
v11 (N − 1)
√
V√
1/N (N − 1)
√
1/N
)(√
r1√
R
)
=
( √
v11r1 + (N − 1)
√
V R√
r1/N + (N − 1)
√
R/N
)
with a normalization condition r1 + (N − 1)R = 1. The stable distribution from the simplified matrix
then yields r1 as a function of v11, which has ∂r1/∂v11 = 0 and r1 = 1/N at v11 = 1/N . In short, the best
possible preference for person 1 is an egalitarian one. If egalitarianism is pervasive, one gets worse off by
having another type of preference, which means that egalitarianism is a strict Nash equilibrium [20]. This
reproduces Dworkin’s paradox in mathematical terms in the sense that a non-egalitarian in an egalitarian
society will have relatively less welfare. A difference from the original paradox is that the official cannot
really compensate the non-egalitarian within our formulation since the welfare distribution will converge
to the same point again as soon as the compensation is known in public.
Inhomogeneous society
Egalitarian preference can be still favorable even when people are all different. For instance, people
are not equally born. Let this unavoidable inequality be described by a uniform random variable ζi ∈
[−1, 1]. Person i’s overall political preference can be described by another uniform random variable
φi ∈ (−1/N, 1/N): for φi = 0, this person is an egalitarian. If φi > 0, she believes that the better deserve
more, while φi < 0 means the opposite. In addition, φi is assumed to be uncorrelated with ζi. The political
preference is then assigned as vij = φiζj+1/N , which satisfies vij > 0. Since ζj is a relative quantity, one
can always subtract an offset value to make
∑
j ζj = 0, by which the normalization condition
∑
j vij = 1
is satisfied. We can obtain the stable distribution by taking N as a very large constant and assuming
that ri is a function of φi only. By replacing the summation in
√
ri(φi) ∝
∑N
j=1
√
φiζj + 1/N
√
rj(φj)
by an integral, we get
ri(φi) = 2φ
−2
i
[
(φi + 1/N)
3/2 − (−φi + 1/N)3/2
]2
/(3pi + 8),
where the proportionality coefficient is determined by the normalization condition. This ri is an even
function of φi with a maximum ri(φi = 0) = 18/(3pi + 8) × 1/N ≈ 1.033/N , implying the highest
fulfillment for an egalitarian. One could point out that this ri(φi) describes just one possible distribution,
not necessarily the stable one. However, we see that the integral is positive for all φi, and thus for all i,
and the Perron-Frobenius theorem tells us that this positivity is true only for the stable distribution [18].
This justifies our starting assumption that person i’s welfare ri is not determined by her innate part ζi but
by her political preference φi in this society. It is notable that critics have said that the idea of equality
in welfare is insensitive to individual responsibility [7]. As explained in [21], one may consider a set of
variables characterizing an individual and classify them into two categories: the first category consists of
innate properties such as talents that an individual is hardly responsible for. The second category, on the
6other hand, includes choices and even some of preferences that we can connect to individual responsibility.
If we regard ζi as representing the first category while φi as representing the second category, this example
shows that each individual does take responsibility for her political preference but not for her talents.
It could be also argued that the limit N → ∞ squeezes φi ∈ (−1/N, 1/N) into zero so that the whole
problem reduces to the egalitarian society above, where everyone gets ri = 1/N . That can be regarded as
a first-order approximation of this problem. The calculation given here shows that an egalitarian indeed
receives 3.3% more than in the crude approximation.
Homogeneously unequal preference
In all the cases considered so far, preferences could be said to be neutral on the society level in the sense
that there is no systematic bias over the whole society. Let us now imagine that N − 1 persons with
identical preferences, h = (h1, h2, . . . , hN ), but not necessarily egalitarians. The other person indexed by
k has another type of preference, vk = (vk1, vk2, . . . , vkN ). By the similar reasoning as in the egalitarian
society, the situation can be simplified to the following 2× 2 matrix:(√
vkk
√
(N − 1)(1− vkk)√
hk
∑
i
′′√
hi
)
,
where
∑
i
′′ means a summation over i excluding k. Recall that the (N − 1) persons with an identical
preference have the same amount of fulfillment so person k should not distinguish them in order to
maximize affinity between her preference and the welfare distribution among them. The above matrix
means that we should only determine how to divide welfare between the person k and the other (N − 1)
persons. The eigenvalue analysis leads to
rk = (1− vkk)(1− vkk +X2/4) (6)
with
X ≡ √vkk −H −
√
(
√
vkk −H)2 + 4
√
hk(N − 1)(1− vkk)
and H ≡ ∑i′′√hi. We can differentiate Eq. (6) with respect to vkk to find the maximum. An easier
alternative way is to observe from the separability that the maximum value is obtained when rk = vkk,
because the question is how to match person k’s preference (vkk, 1 − vkk) with the welfare distribution
(rk, 1 − rk), where the second elements represent the whole (N − 1) persons. By solving rk = vkk with
Eq. (6), one can get vkk maximizing rk as a solution of the following equation,
[hk(N − 1) +H2]w4 − 2Hw3 + (1−H2)w2 + 2Hw − 1 = 0, (7)
with w ≡ √vkk. For the egalitarian h with hk = 1/N and H = (N − 1)
√
1/N , substituting vkk = 1/N
satisfies Eq. (7), consistently with the analysis of the (N − 1) egalitarians. We may also suppose that
h describes an unequal distribution so that the whole society is biased in a certain way. As a specific
example, let us assume that hi ∝ i2, that is, almost everyone wants people with higher indices to have more
welfare. With a normalization constant, it should mean that hi = i
2/Z with Z ≡ N(N + 1)(2N + 1)/6,
and we thus have
H =
N∑
i=1
√
hi −
√
hk =
√
6N(N + 1)/(2
√
2N + 1)− k/
√
Z.
Inserting this into Eq. (6), we plot rk in Fig. 2, where the maximum is found at the crossing with rk = vkk.
It is a little higher than 1/N for every k. We can do the same calculation for a more severe situation
of inequality by setting hi ∝ i4, which again yields the same conclusion with a bit larger vkk. The
difference between the optimal vkk and 1/N does not vanish as N →∞ whether hi ∝ i2 or i4. This can
7be shown by inserting vkk = 1/N on the left-hand side of Eq. (7) and taking N → ∞, which does not
yield zero on the right-hand side. Therefore, the person k should demand a little more for herself than
before and distribute the remainder of the preferences equally to the others, even though they are far
from egalitarians, in order to get the maximum welfare.
Transient behavior
In order to see whether egalitarians can eventually take over the society, we need to check whether the
egalitarian preference remains as an attractive alternative when the society has both egalitarians and
non-egalitarians with significant numbers. Let us imagine an inhomogeneous society where there are
roughly two large groups: every person in one group of size N −M occupies a high index i and believes
that the welfare should be proportional to i2. On the other hand, every person in the other group of
size M − 1 has a low index and an egalitarian preference. Our question is what kind of preference is
good for a person on the border, i.e., with index i = M . Again, since people with identical preferences
will get the same amount of welfare, the focal person on the border need not distinguish the members
in each group: suppose that she wishes vM1 for each member in the egalitarian group and vMN for
each member in the non-egalitarian group. The normalization condition then determines her self-interest
vMM = 1− (M − 1)vM1 − (N −M)vMN . Depending on how she decides vM1 and vMN , her final welfare
rM will be calculated by analyzing the following 3× 3 matrix,
 (M − 1)/
√
N
√
1/N (N −M)/√N
(M − 1)√vM1 √vMM (N −M)√vMN
M(M−1)
2
√
Z
M/
√
Z N(N+1)
2
√
Z
− M(M+1)
2
√
Z

 , (8)
where the second row describes this focal person M . The conservation of the total welfare is imposed by
setting (M − 1)rM1 + rMM + (N −M)rMN = 1. When M is small, the maximum of rM is close to the
egalitarian solution (vM1, vMN ) = (1/N, 1/N) (Fig. 3A). It agrees with the result of the homogeneously
unequal preferences given above since the egalitarian preference is still an absolute minority. Hence, if
this person M can choose her own preference, the society will possibly have one more egalitarian. As
M becomes larger, however, the situation gets different in that the maximum is located far from the
egalitarian solution (Fig. 3B). It implies that the transition process toward the egalitarian direction may
exhibit transient behavior, instead of being smooth all the time.
Discussion
The theory of welfare is not an empty ideal as claimed in [7]: dealing with a society where everyone has an
identical non-egalitarian preference, we have found that the theory recommends something very similar
to an egalitarian preference, instead of just rubber-stamping the dominant non-egalitarian opinion. In
addition, this finding shows that the egalitarian society is in fact the only strict Nash equilibrium. We
therefore conclude that our analysis gives a strong support to equality of welfare by specifying which
social and political conditions make it possible.
On the other hand, our conclusion implies that a society can encourage egalitarianism by guaranteeing
freedom of communication so that everyone can constantly express her fulfillment in public. In this
respect, we can perhaps mention one of the central messages in [7] that “liberty is essential to any
process in which equality is defined and secured.” In particular, we would like to put an extra emphasis
on the communicative aspect of the liberty.
On a longer perspective, our results suggest an explanation of how the concept of fairness could
develop at a certain moment in the history of evolution when human beings became able to construct
internal expectation for the future and understand others’ minds by communication. It is also worth
8stressing that our conclusion on egalitarianism as a strict Nash equilibrium under certain well-defined
conditions is strong enough to open further theoretical extensions and empirical tests.
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Figure Legends
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Figure 1. Person 1’s welfare in the two-person case, obtained from Eq. (5). The curves on
the plane show contour lines.
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Figure 2. Equation (6) as a function of vkk when hi ∝ i2 for N = 10. The horizontal line shows
rk = 1/N . The maximum of rk is located at the crossing with the line rk = vkk.
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Figure 3. rM (vM1, vMN ) obtained by solving Eq. (8) within a region
0 ≤ (M − 1)vM1 + (N −M)vMN ≤ 1 for N = 10. (A) M = 2. (B) M = 5. The crosses show
(vM1, vMN ) = (1/N, 1/N).
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Appendix: derivation of the affinity function
Let us consider two arbitrary distributions, p = (p1, . . . , pN ) and q = (q1, . . . , qN ), with pi ≥ 0, qi ≥ 0,
and
∑N
i pi =
∑N
i qi = 1. We will define an affinity function ρN (p, q) between them, whose specific
functional form will be characterized by requiring the following postulates.
• P1: Separability
ρN
(
p1, . . . , pN
q1, . . . , qN
)
= ρN−k+1
(
Pk, pk+1, . . . , pN
Qk, qk+1, . . . , qN
)
+∆(Pk, Qk)
[
ρk
( p1
Pk
, . . . , pkPk
q1
Qk
, . . . , qkQk
)
− 1
]
,
where Pk ≡ p1 + p2 + · · · + pk and Qk ≡ q1 + q2 + · · · + qk are positive with 1 < k < N . In
addition, ∆(Pk, Qk) is a non-negative differentiable function and converges to zero as Pk → 0 or
Qk → 0. The situation can be described as follows: we first observe p′ = (Pk, pk+1, . . . , pN ) and
q′ = (Qk, qk+1, . . . , qN ), instead of the real p and q. We can calculate affinity ρN−k+1 in this
resolution. The question is how affinity will change when we come to know the real p and q. If
the substructures inside Pk and Qk have an exact affinity by ρk = 1, nothing will change from the
previous calculation, i.e., ρN = ρN−k+1. If they actually had no affinity by ρk = 0 in this better
resolution, on the other hand, the overall affinity should decrease by a certain amount ∆, which
will be a function of Pk and Qk. For example, for Pk ≪ 1 or Qk ≪ 1, the decrement in ρN will be
also vanishingly small even if the subpopulations inside them look completely different.
• P2: Invariance under permutation
ρ3
(
p1, p2, p3
q1, q2, q3
)
= ρ3
(
p2, p1, p3
q2, q1, q3
)
= . . . = ρ3
(
p3, p2, p1
q3, q2, q1
)
.
Note that it is for N = 3, which is enough to prove the same property for general N in combination
with the other postulates.
• P3: Non-negativity
ρN (p, q) ≥ 0,
where ρN (p, q) = 0 if and only if p is orthogonal to q, whereas a maximum value is obtained if and
only if p = q.
• P4: Symmetry
ρN (p, q) = ρN (q,p).
Let us explain some direct consequences of P1. For N = 2, it yields a trivial equality. For N = 3, we
have
ρ3
(
p1, p2, p3
q1, q2, q3
)
= ρ2
(
P2, p3
Q2, q3
)
+∆(P2, Q2)
[
ρ2
( p1
P2
, p2P2
q1
Q2
, q2Q2
)
− 1
]
.
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For N = 4, we will see two different ways to calculate affinity between (P3, p4) and (Q3, q4). The first
way is the following:
ρ4
(
p1, . . . , p4
q1, . . . , q4
)
= ρ2
(
P3, p4
Q3, q4
)
+∆(P3, Q3)
[
ρ3
( p1
P3
, p2P3 ,
p3
P3
q1
Q3
, q2Q3 ,
q3
Q3
)
− 1
]
= ρ2
(
P3, p4
Q3, q4
)
+∆(P3, Q3)
{
ρ2
(
P2
P3
, p3P3
Q2
Q3
, q3Q3
)
+∆
(
P2
P3
,
Q2
Q3
)[
ρ2
( p1
P2
, p2P2
q1
Q2
, q2Q2
)
− 1
]
− 1
}
. (9)
We then consider another way to calculate the same quantity as follows:
ρ4
(
p1, . . . , p4
q1, . . . , q4
)
= ρ3
(
P2, p3, p4
Q2, q3, q4
)
+∆(P2, Q2)
[
ρ2
( p1
P2
, p2P2
q1
Q2
, q2Q2
)
− 1
]
= ρ2
(
P3, p4
Q3, q4
)
+∆(P3, Q3)
[
ρ2
(
P2
P3
, p3P3
Q2
Q3
, q3Q3
)
− 1
]
+∆(P2, Q2)
[
ρ2
( p1
P2
, p2P2
q1
Q2
, q2Q2
)
− 1
]
. (10)
Comparing Eq. (9) with Eq. (10), we see that
∆(P3, Q3)∆
(
P2
P3
,
Q2
Q3
)
= ∆(P2, Q2). (11)
Note that P2/P3 can take any value between zero and one, regardless of P3, and that Q2/Q3 is also
independent of Q3 in the same way, as long as P3 and Q3 are nonzero.
Now we define
g(x, y) ≡ ρ2
(
x, 1 − x
y, 1− y
)
− 1, (12)
for x, y ∈ [0, 1]. From P1 and P2, it is straightforward to verify
g(x, y) = g(1− x, 1− y), (13)
since
ρ3
(
p1, p2, p3
q1, q2, q3
)
= ρ3
(
p2, p1, p3
q2, q1, q3
)
= ρ2
(
P2, p3
Q2, q3
)
+∆(P2, Q2)
[
ρ2
( p1
P2
, p2P2
q1
Q2
, q2Q2
)
− 1
]
= ρ2
(
P2, p3
Q2, q3
)
+∆(P2, Q2)
[
ρ2
( p2
P2
, p1P2
q2
Q2
, q1Q2
)
− 1
]
.
Applying P1 to another permutation
ρ3
(
p1, p2, p3
q1, q2, q3
)
= ρ3
(
p3, p2, p1
q3, q2, q1
)
,
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we are directly led to
g(p3, q3) + ∆(1− p3, 1− q3)g
(
p1
1− p3 ,
q1
1− q3
)
= g(p1, q1) + ∆(1− p1, 1− q1)g
(
p3
1− p1 ,
q3
1− q1
)
,
where p1, p3, q1, q3 ∈ [0, 1). Let us redefine the variables as p11−p3 ≡ p,
q1
1−q3 ≡ q, 1−p3 ≡ r, and 1−q3 ≡ s.
Each of these new variables p, q, r, and s can take an arbitrary value independently of one another, as
long as p, q ∈ [0, 1] and r, s ∈ (0, 1). The above equality can be then rewritten as
g(r, s) + ∆(r, s)g(p, q)
= g(pr, qs) + ∆(1 − pr, 1− qs)g
(
1−r
1−pr ,
1−s
1−qs
)
. (14)
Defining a function
f(p, q, r, s) ≡ g(r, s) + [∆(r, s) + ∆(1 − r, 1− s)] g(p, q) (15)
for p, q, r, s ∈ (0, 1), we apply Eq. (14) to f(p, q, r, s) to obtain
f(p, q, r, s) = g(pr, qs)
+∆(1− pr, 1− qs)g
(
1− r
1− pr ,
1− s
1− qs
)
+∆(1− r, 1− s)g(p, q).
Note from Eq. (11) that
∆(p2 + p3, q2 + q3)∆
(
p3
p2 + p3
,
q3
q2 + q3
)
= ∆(1 − pr, 1− qs)∆
(
1− r
1− pr ,
1− s
1− qs
)
= ∆(1 − r, 1− s).
Hence, we see that
f(p, q, r, s)
= g(pr, qs) + ∆(1 − pr, 1− qs)g
(
1− r
1− pr ,
1− s
1− qs
)
+∆(1− pr, 1− qs)∆
(
1− r
1− pr ,
1− s
1− qs
)
g(p, q)
= g(pr, qs) + ∆(1 − pr, 1− qs)
[
g
(
1− r
1− pr ,
1− s
1− qs
)
+∆
(
1− r
1− pr ,
1− s
1− qs
)
g(p, q)
]
(16)
= g(pr, qs) + ∆(1 − pr, 1− qs)
{
g
[
p(1− r)
1− pr ,
q(1− s)
1− qs
]
+ ∆
(
1− p
1− qr ,
1− q
1− qs
)
g(r, s)
}
, (17)
14
where the last equality comes from Eq. (14). Equation (13) then gives us
g
[
p(1− r)
1− pr ,
q(1− s)
1− qs
]
= g
(
1− p
1− pr ,
1− q
1− qs
)
,
relating Eqs. (16) and (17) as follows:
f(p, q, r, s)
= g(pr, qs) + ∆(1− pr, 1− qs)
[
g
(
1− r
1− pr ,
1− s
1− qs
)
+ ∆
(
1− r
1− pr ,
1− s
1− qs
)
g(p, q)
]
= g(pr, qs) + ∆(1− pr, 1− qs)
[
g
(
1− p
1− pr ,
1− q
1− qs
)
+ ∆
(
1− p
1− pr ,
1− q
1− qs
)
g(r, s)
]
.
In short, we have just confirmed that
f(p, q, r, s) = f(r, s, p, q).
From the definition of f(p, q, r, s) in Eq. (15), we see that
g(r, s)
g(p, q)
=
∆(r, s) + ∆(1− r, 1− s)− 1
∆(p, q) + ∆(1− p, 1− q)− 1 .
For this to be true for every independent set of (p, q, r, s), it must be that
g(r, s) = C[∆(r, s) + ∆(1 − r, 1− s)− 1]
with a certain constant C. Then P1 says that
lim
r→0
s→1
g(r, s) = −C,
which is the lowest possible value of g(r, s). However, according to the definition of g(r, s) in Eq. (12)
and P3, this lower bound should be −1. In other words, C = 1 and
ρ2
(
r, 1− r
s, 1− s
)
= ∆(r, s) + ∆(1 − r, 1− s).
We have restricted our variables as r ∈ (0, 1) and s ∈ (0, 1), but it is not difficult to check that the above
expression can be readily used in r ∈ [0, 1] and s ∈ [0, 1] when ∆ is characterized as will be discussed
below. Then P1 works as a recursive relation, yielding an expression for general N :
ρN =
N∑
i=1
∆(pi, qi). (18)
Now we ask ourselves how ∆ should look. P1 and P4 imply that ∆ can be expanded as ∆(pi, qi) =
c1(piqi)
α1 + c2(piqi)
α2 + · · · with coefficients cn and exponents αn > 0. So let us write
ρN =
N∑
i=1
∞∑
n=1
cn(piqi)
αn .
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If we define lα(p, q) ≡
∑N
i=1(piqi)
α, it means that ρN should be of the following form,
ρN (p, q) =
∞∑
n=1
cnlαn(p, q). (19)
Among every possible lα, it is only l1/2 that satisfies the maximization condition in P3. This can be
shown by variational calculus using a Lagrange multiplier µ,
∂
∂qi

lα(p, q)− µ N∑
j=1
qj


qi=pi
= αp2α−1i − µ = 0,
which is satisfied for any pi when α = 1/2 and µ = α. Hence we separate this term from the others in
Eq. (19) as
ρN (p, q) = cl1/2(p, q) +
∑
n
′
cnlαn(p, q),
where
∑′ means that αn = 1/2 is excluded from the summation. There exists a maximum value in ρN ,
which is obtained by
ρN (p,p) = cl1/2(p,p) +
∑
n
′
cnlαn(p,p)
= c+
∑
n
′
cn
∑
i
p2αni ,
noting that l1/2(p,p) =
∑
i pi = 1. Since this value is the same for every p, the last term should be kept
constant for any pi, and we have to choose cn = 0 for every n in the second term. To sum up, our affinity
function is characterized as
ρN (p, q) = c
N∑
i=1
(piqi)
1/2
with a positive constant c, the maximum value of ρN .
